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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a mathematical expression of closure to efficient causation in terms of 
λ-calculus; we argue that this opens up the perspective of developing principled computer 
simulations of systems closed to efficient causation in an appropriate programming language. 
An important implication of our formulation is that, by exhibiting an expression in λ-calculus, 
which is a paradigmatic formalism for computability and programming, we show that there are 
no conceptual or principled problems in realizing a computer simulation or model of closure to 
efficient causation. We conclude with a brief discussion of the question whether closure to 
efficient causation captures all relevant properties of living systems. We suggest that it might 
not be the case, and that more complex definitions could indeed create some obstacles to 
computability. 
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1. Introduction 
All fully-fledged scientific objects, from atoms to black holes, are constituted in theory. 
If contemporary biology is excessively focussed on genes, as a number of critical 
commentators have suggested (Fox-Keller, 2000; Oyama, 1985; Lewontin, 1984), this 
is nothing but a logical consequence of the fact that genes are indeed constituted in 
theory (Jacob, 1970), whereas (to date) living organisms as such are not. Consequently, 
it is common to adopt a merely common-sense definition of life, and then to develop 
models of specific aspects of living organisms. According to an increasing number of 
researchers, however, this scientific approach to biological systems is missing the point 
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in an important sense: we are not modelling the organism as living, we are just treating 
it as thought it were not alive. Robert Rosen (1991, pp 111-112), referring to the life 
work of his mentor Rashevsky, writes: “No collection of separate models, however 
comprehensive, could be pasted together to capture the organism itself”. In this sense, 
the heart of the question lies in the construction of a theoretical (preferably 
mathematical) model, which captures what should be considered the key properties of 
living systems. 
At the present time, one of the most prominent proposals aimed at providing a 
theoretical characterization of life is Rosen’s definition in terms of closure to efficient 
causation (Rosen, 1991). Rosen’s proposal is thus, potentially, of the greatest 
importance for biology as a whole, since it could contribute to a better balance between 
Genetics and a Biology of Organisms (Stewart, 2004). However, as noted with 
perspicacity by Letelier et al. (2006), Rosen’s work has been very diversely appreciated. 
Some authors consider that Rosen is indeed the “Newton of biology” (Mikulecky, 2001) 
and some others have tried to apply Rosen’s framework to build a mathematical model 
of metabolism (Letelier et al., 2006). Wolkenhauer & Hofmeyr (2007) developed an 
abstract cell model inspired by Rosen’s ideas. Moreover, a considerable amount of work 
has been recently undertaken to clarify the conceptual relations between the concept of 
closure to efficient causation and that of autopoïesis (Nomura, 2007; Letelier et al., 
2003; Zaretzky & Letelier, 2002). Yet, despite its strong theoretical interest, Rosen’s 
work has had so far regrettably little impact on the mainstream of contemporary 
biology.  
Among the possible reasons for this lack of influence (to date), the one we wish to focus 
on in this paper has already been pointed out by other authors (Letelier et al., 2006): this 
is the fact that Rosen’s original formulation in terms of Category Theory, although 
intuitively understandable, was not easily biologically interpretable, nor operationally 
generative. The purpose of this paper is to propose an interpretation of Rosen’s closure 
to efficient causation in terms of (type-free) lambda-calculus. The importance of our 
proposal lies in the fact that lambda-calculus lies at the very heart of modern definitions 
of “computability”. In this sense, above and beyond the interest of the lambda-calculus 
formulation itself, our proposal thus opens up the perspective of developing computer 
simulations of closure to efficient causation in an appropriate programming language.  
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This is a key issue, both theoretically and operationally. As a matter of fact, one of 
Rosen’s best known theses, supported with a mathematical demonstration, is that 
closure to efficient causation has no computable models (Rosen, 1991 p. 235-243). We 
may call this “Rosen’s conjecture” (Stewart & Mossio, 2007). At present, the status of 
this conjecture is uncertain and controversial. Whereas some studies have claimed that 
Rosen’s purported proof of the conjecture is flawed (Chu & Ho, 2007a; Chu & Ho, 
2007b; Chu & Ho, 2006; Landauer & Bellman, 2002), their conclusions have been 
contested as wrong and irrelevant by advocates of Rosen’s thesis (Louie, 2007 and 
2006), and the logic underlying Rosen’s conjecture has been restated and defended 
(Chemero & Turvey, 2007; Kercel, 2007).  
In addition, it should be noted that some studies have recently tried to spell out some 
relevant implications of the (supposed) non-computability of closure to efficient 
causation, as if Rosen’s demonstration were correct. In particular, Letelier and co-
workers have recently argued that autopoietic systems are a subset of (M,R)-systems 
and that therefore they inherit the property of being non-computable (Letelier et al., 
2003). During the last thirty years, a specific line of research in field of Artificial Life 
has developed computational simulations of autopoietic systems (see McMullin, 2004 
for a recent review). If Letelier’s thesis is correct, this would have a major impact on the 
relevance of these studies: we should conclude that, whatever organization they 
simulate, they are not (and could not) properly simulating autopoïesis.The expression of 
closure to efficient causation in terms of lambda-calculus proposed in this paper may 
constitute a useful contribution to this debate, since it shows that there are no conceptual 
problems in realizing computational simulations of closure on the basis of the classical 
definition of computability. We consider that this result revitalizes Rosen’s proposal by 
opening up a whole new vista of possible expressions through principled computer 
simulations, going beyond mere ad hoc tinkering to capture (at least some) relevant 
properties of “life itself”, at least as defined by Rosen’s formalism. 
At this point, it may be useful to interject a clarification that we have discussed at 
greater length in (Stewart & Mossio, 2007). Rosen (1991) makes a clear and important 
distinction between a modelling relationship and a simulation. In the modelling 
relationship (p.60), a natural system N is put in relation with a formal system F. In order 
for this to succeed, F must itself have a structure of efficient causes that is potentially 
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congruent with that of the natural system. In a Turing machine (or any formal 
equivalent thereof), there is only one efficient cause: the reading-head. Since there is not 
a human-built Turing machine such that its operation actually produces its own reading-
head, nothing in the operation of a computer can be adequate to authentically model 
CTEC. In this sense, “life itself” is definitely not computable. 
This does not, however, foreclose the discussion; because the question remains open as 
to whether it may not be possible to simulate CTEC. Rosen (1991, pp. 191-193) gives a 
very clear discussion and definition of “simulation”. In causal terms, simulation 
involves the conversion of efficient cause, the hardware of that which is being 
simulated, into material cause in the simulator. In such a computational universe, the 
most that can be done is to set up a system of structures that construct and maintain each 
other in the circular fashion exemplified by CTEC. Even this remains a far from trivial 
exercise; but we claim that our lambda-calculus formulation shows that it is indeed 
possible. 
The structure of this article is the following. We will first recall (section 2) the 
conceptual framework necessary for qualitative expression of the notion of closure to 
efficient causation. We next discuss (sections 3 and 4) the question of which 
mathematical tools are most adequate and fruitful for expressing this concept. This leads 
us (section 5) to our central proposition, a formulation of closure to efficient causation 
in terms of lambda-calculus. Since our formulation implies, in contrast with Rosen’s 
own claim, the computability of closure to efficient causation, we next try to spell out 
(section 6) the reasons for the divergence with respect to Rosen’s conclusions, as well 
as (section 7) other authors’ interpretations. We then provide some preliminary 
guidelines (section 8) on how the closure to efficient causation expressed in terms of λ-
calculus could be implemented as a computer simulation preserving the essential 
properties of the formal model. Finally (section 9), we conclude with a brief discussion 
of the question whether closure to efficient causation captures all relevant properties of 
living systems. We suggest that this it might not be the case, and that more complex 
definitions could indeed create some obstacles to computability.  
2. Closure to efficient causation 
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Rosen’s whole conceptual scheme is based on a rehabilitation and reinterpretation of the 
Aristotelian categories of causality: material cause, efficient cause, and (under certain 
conditions, but we will not discuss this point here) final cause. Rosen presents the 
Aristotelian categories as different ways of answering the question “why?” Given a 
mathematical function, b = f(a), there are two answers to the question “why b?”: (i) 
“because a”, i.e. the argument of the function, which Rosen interprets as the “material 
cause”; and (ii) “because f” where the function f is interpreted as the “efficient cause”. 
In set-theoretical terms, if a and b are in the domain and co-domain of f, respectively, 
then f maps a to b. Applied to the case of state-determined dynamic systems (SDDS), 
the mapping is an endomorphism from x(t), the state-vector at time t, to the “next state” 
x(t+dt). The whole art of finding a mathematical expression of SDDS is to choose the 
state variables in such a way that the state x(t+dt) is a function only of the state x(t) 
(Rosen, 1991, pp. 89-98).  
This formulation enables Rosen to express what is, in his view, the difference between 
physics and biology. In physics, we can ask questions about the state of a dynamic 
system. “Why x(t)?” – (i) “because x(t0)”, the state at any reference time t0; this is the 
“material cause”; and (ii) “because f”, the dynamic law; this is the “efficient cause” (in 
more common terms: f is the evolution function of the dynamics). But if we ask the 
question “why f?”, within physics there is not really any answer, other than that this just 
is a natural law. Rosen’s proposition is that this is where biology is different: for a 
living organism, the question “why f?” has a non-trivial answer from within the 
functioning of the system itself. Let us look at this a little closer. 
There is fairly wide agreement that metabolism is at the core of living organisms. In 
Rosen’s formulation (Rosen, 1991, p. 249), this is expressed by the equation:  
B = f(A) (E1) 
where A is the “material cause” of the metabolism, f is the “efficient cause” of the 
metabolism, and B is the result. To give a rough-and-ready interpretation, A 
corresponds to the input materials and energy; f may be associated with the set of 
enzymes which are necessary to catalyze the biochemical reactions, but also the cell 
membrane, necessary to avoid loss of reactants by diffusion, and probably other features 
of cell organization as well; and B corresponds to the total resulting biochemical 
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network. We will return later to the question of biological interpretations of these 
formulae. 
What characterizes living organisms is that the maintenance, and indeed the ongoing 
production of this “metabolism” function, are themselves ensured by the functioning of 
the organism. In Rosen’s formalism, this is expressed by a second function, Φ, which 
takes B as material cause and which produces f; Rosen (1991, p. 250) calls this function 
repair:  
f = Φ(B) (E2) 
Now by an iteration of the same argument, we must now ask: “why Φ?” As before, we 
can introduce a new function, b, which Rosen (1991, p. 250) calls replication: 
Φ = β(f) (E3’) 
The point is that we now see clearly the threat of an incipient infinite regress. On the 
face of it we will require another function for the production of β, and then yet another 
function for the production of this function, and so on indefinitely. We come now to the 
key point: Rosen makes the crucial observation that the infinite regress can be avoided 
by introducing a circularity: β can be identified with B, which is already produced by 
the system (Equation [E1]). Thus (E3’) becomes: 
Φ = B(f)   (E3) 
We thus arrive at the situation which Rosen (1991, p. 251) calls « closure to efficient 
causation », in which each efficient cause is materially produced within the system, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. The three efficient causes – f, the metabolism function; Φ, the 
repair function; and B, the replication function – are all produced by the operation of the 
system itself. Rosen considers that “closure to efficient causation” – hereafter “CTEC” 
– is the essential defining property of “life itself” (Rosen, 1991, p. 244). 
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Figure 1. Rosen’s relational model of closure to efficient causation. White arrows represent 
relations of material causation; black arrows represent relations of efficient causation. 
In the following section we will see how CTEC can be easily related to Cartesian 
Closed Categories (CCC), which are suitable structures to deal at once with 
mathematical objects and transformations on these objects, a key point in Rosen’s 
approach, as extensively explained in Letelier et al. (2006). We will interpret Rosen’s 
formalism in CCC by relying on the strong relations existing between CCC and lambda-
calculus.  
Note that the interpretation of Rosen’s formalism is far from obvious (and is not 
necessarily unique). In Life Itself, Φ and f appear to be morphisms. Yet, and this is the 
challenge, in the diagrams they are also objects, that is they are also sources and targets 
of morphisms, while B, an object, may act as a morphism on f, say, as expressed in the 
equational writing above. As shown below, the λ-calculus makes it possible to deal with 
such an apparent type-theoretic mismatch; in particular, by constructing the CCC of 
“finitary projections” (Amadio et al., 1986) out of a type-free model. In this category, 
both types (as objects) and morphisms are “elements” of the type-free universe, thus 
they can freely act one on the other. We will not spell out the finitary projection 
interpretation in full detail, as this would require a lengthy and highly technical 
exposition. We restrict ourselves here to noting that the free use of B, Φ and f both as 
morphisms and as objects may be fully mathematically justified (see Amadio et al., 
1986). 
3. Lambda calculus 
In order to formulate the theoretical concept of CTEC, Rosen employed the 
mathematical formalism of mappings and abstract block diagrams (Rosen 1991, p. 
123ff). This formalism is perfectly adequate for its primary purpose, which is to express 
the qualitative concept of CTEC as such. However, as we have already mentioned in the 
introduction, it would seem that in practice theoretical biologists have not been able to 
actually use this formalism to generate detailed models of living organisms and/or 
testable predictions (see also Letelier et al., 2006 on this point). This raises the question 
of a possible alternative formalism, in order to give Rosen’s proposal a more 
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operationally fruitful mathematical expression. It seems to us that the essential 
requirement to attain this objective is the following: given a mathematical function, b = 
f(a), we need a formalism in which the same entity can occupy the three roles of 
argument (a), function (f) and result (b); moreover, the notation must also be such that it 
is perfectly clear at each point which role is being played. As clearly pointed out by 
Fontana & Buss (1994) in a related context, λ-calculus meets these requirements 
exactly.  
Type-free λ-calculus (Church, 1932/1933; Barendregt, 1984) is a formal theory of 
functional abstraction and application. In Mathematics the notation f(x) is indeed 
ambiguous: does it denote the mapping from x to f(x), or the value of f at x?  Let us then 
write f(x) only for the expression or value of f on x, and denote λx.f(x) for the mapping 
from x to f(x) (the operation is called “λ-abstraction” or functional abstraction). So, λ 
“binds” variables and makes explicit the functional dependence of functions on 
variables. More generally, λx.f(x,y), where x is bound and y is free, is the mapping from 
x to f(x,y), which differs of course from λy.f(x,y), where the explicit functional 
dependence is on y. This also allows us to explicitly formalize the evaluation of 
functions on arguments, by (functional) “application”: for instance, from (λx.f(x,y)).5 
one obtains f(5,y). So, (λx.(λy.(x2+y)).4).5 gives first (λy.(25+y)).4), then 25+4 
(parentheses are very important in λ-calculus, as in the many derived programming 
languages such as LISP). The calculus is type-free, which means that it contains no 
constraints on what may be a function and what an argument; yet, their role in each term 
is specified by the order and the use of parentheses. Thus, one may apply x to y or y to 
x or even write x.x and then, for instance, abstract: λx.x.x. The consistency of this very 
expressive calculus (it computes all Turing-computable functions) is assured by a 
fundamental theorem due to Church and Rosser (Barendregt, 1984; Hindley & Seldin, 
1986). 
In more formal terms, both the formal theory and the mathematical semantics contain:  
o a sign λ (or a semantic operator) for denoting (or interpreting) a functional 
operator; 
o a sign “.” (or a semantic application) for denoting (or interpreting) functional 
application. 
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That is, it is a formal applicative and non-commutative structure (X, λ, .), where: 
o λx.M forms a function of x from any formal expression M (we say that λ binds x 
in λx.M; if a variable y occurs and it is not bound in M, then it is free in M); 
o M.N forms the application of M to N. 
Formal expressions, or terms, are made out of variables: x, y, z...; parentheses: “(” and 
“)”; and the operators λ and . (usually, one writes (MN) for M.N and omit “.”). Thus, if 
M and N are terms, λx.M and (MN) are terms (and nothing else is a term). Note that one 
can form xy and yx, which are thus both legal terms, but that xy ≠ yx (non 
commutative). 
To this, one has to add the usual axioms for equality, “=” (as a symmetric, reflexive 
transitive and substitutive relation) and one key axiom: 
(β)  (λx.M)N = [N/x]M  
By this axiom the left term is equated to the replacement of the free occurrences of x by 
N in M. The renaming of bound variables may be needed, when replacing x by N in M. 
Equality of λ-terms is handled by the usual congruence rules. λ-calculus is a 
paradigmatic “rewriting system”: all that it does is to replace strings by strings. 
Nevertheless, it has the same expressive power as Turing Machines or any other 
complete formalism for computability (Gödel’s Recursion in Arithmetic, Kleene’s 
equations... see Barendregt, 1984; Hindley & Seldin, 1986). Actual computer languages 
compute at most these computable functions. LISP is an implemented version of type-
free λ-calculus. 
The expressive power of type-free λ-calculus is due to the fixed-point operator:  
Y = λy.(λx.y(xx))( λx.y(xx)).   
By applying several times the (β) axiom above, it is easy to show that for any term M, 
one has, by replacing y by M:  
YM =  (λx.M(xx))(λx.M(xx))  
and then, by replacing x in the first M(xx) by the second λx.M(xx) : 
YM = M((λx.M(xx))(λx.M(xx)))   
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Thus: 
YM = M(YM)   
since  (λx.M(xx))(λx.M(xx)) = YM,  by the first equation. 
Thus, Y produces, uniformly and effectively, a fixed point YM for M, as we have 
shown for YM = M(YM).  In short, given any recursive definition of a function f, which 
is usually given under the form f = Mf for some definiens term M, one can compute f by 
setting f = (YM). 
A turning moment in the scientific role of λ-calculus was the invention of its 
mathematical (categorical) semantics (Scott, 1972), i.e. the construction of a 
“mathematical” (geometric/topological…) structure, independent of the formal syntax 
above, where signs and variables could be interpreted (that is, given a mathematical – 
geometric/algebraic – meaning, in terms, for instance, of elements of a topological 
space, functions on it etc). The semantic difficulty, of course, lies in the type-free 
syntax: terms may act as functions and as arguments. The construction of a reflexive 
object in a category of topological spaces (a CCC, see below) yields a non trivial object 
D, such that (D → D) < D, that is of an isomorphic embedding (or, more precisely, a 
retraction) of its function space into D itself. More formally, I : (D → D) into D  and  J: 
D onto D → D, such that  J(I(f)) = f, which clearly allows, by the (obviously injective) 
embedding I to interpret functions as arguments. The isomorphic embedding (or, also, 
in some cases, an isomorphism, i.e. with also I(J(d)) = d) is not an identity: this will be 
relevant for the discussion below. This work started the broad areas of the mathematical 
semantics of programming languages, (Stoy, 1977; Amadio, & Curien, 1993), and it has 
been already applied in a discussion of Rosen’s approach (see Letelier et al., 2006). 
4. CTEC, Cartesian Closed Categories and Differential Dynamical Systems   
Before developing an expression of CTEC in terms of λ-calculus, a relevant 
mathematical implication should be clarified. By solving Rosen’s equations in (type-
free) λ-calculus, we will interpret CTEC as the constructability of a suitable reflexive 
objectii in a Closed Cartesian Category (CCC)iii.  We will then discuss some of the 
relations of these categories with the usual mathematical modelling of physics in 
smooth manifolds, an issue raised by many authors (quoted on place) concerning 
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Rosen’s approach. 
A category C is a CCC if it has all finite products (and hence has a terminal object); and 
for every pair of objects, say A and B, there exists an exponential or map object A→B, 
which represents, within the category, the collection of all maps from A to B, C(A,B). 
Very importantly, products and exponentials are related by a (natural) isomorphism 
C(_xA,B) ≈ C(_,A→B) (see (Asperti & Longo, 1991), among others).  
The relevance of CCCs for representing CTEC consists in the fact that they allow the 
introduction of maps acting on maps (more precisely, maps’ objects), which is a key 
feature of Rosen’s proposal. In particular, they provide a suitable formalism for 
modelling typed and type-free λ-calculus and, more specifically, “reflexive objects”. As 
a matter of fact, given a reflexive object in any category, one can construct out of the 
object a (non trivial) CCC, as a (full) subcategory of the given category (Longo & 
Moggi, 1990). Thus, by these further steps, our treatment of Rosen’s equations is done 
in a CCC, since once the CTEC equations are solved in a type-free model, this 
automatically yields a CCC. It also happens that reflexive objects may be found in 
Cartesian Closed Categories of effective objects, in the sense of computability theory; in 
particular, in Hyland’s Effective Topos (Longo & Moggi, 1991)iv. Moreover, the entire 
construction can be carried on in fully effective (computable) topoi.  
Wolkenhauer & Hofmeyr (2007) make several interesting remarks concerning the 
“difficult” interplay between purely mathematical modelling using (partial) differential 
equations on one hand, and computability structures (such as the λ-calculus models we 
present here) on the other. In particular, they mention the fact that there is in principle 
no way to have CCCs over smooth manifolds, the latter being the natural frame for 
differential equations. The λ-calculus solutions to CTEC we present below necessarily 
involve reflexive objects and hence yield CCCs; it follows that they are not compatible 
with smooth manifolds. 
It may be useful to further elaborate on the remarks in Wolkenhauer & Hofmeyr (2007). 
In a CCC D, by definition, one has a (natural) isomorphism between D(AxB, C), the 
morphisms from AxB to C, and D(A, B→C), where B→C is the exponent object 
representing D(B,C) within the category D. An immediate consequence of this 
isomorphism over topological spaces is that any component-wise continuous function is 
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globally continuous. This is false, in general, over smooth manifolds. Finally (and even 
more crucially), in a reflexive object A, the embedding of A→A into A also implies that 
AxA can be isomorphically embedded into A (Longo & Moggi, 1990). This is strictly in 
contrast with the notion of “dimension as a topological invariant”v, which holds in 
smooth manifolds with the “natural” or interval topology. This notion of dimension is 
crucial in Physics; and these smooth manifolds are the mathematical structures typically 
used to model physical processes in general, and SDDS in particularvi.  
5. The expression of closure in lambda calculus 
We are now in a position to address the core of this article: an expression of closure to 
efficient causation in λ-calculus terms. In type-free λ-calculus notation, Rosen’s 
equations (E1, E2 and E3) become: 
(fA) = B (L1)  
(ΦB) = f (L2) 
(Bf) = Φ (L3) 
Thus, by replacing B in (L2) and (L3) and then Φ in (L2), one has:   
((fA)f)(fA) = f    
How can such an f be constructed in type-free λ-calculus, once A is given?  Let now: 
G = λx.((xA)x)(xA)    
and    
Y = λy.(λx.y(xx))(λx.y(xx))   (the fixed point operator).  
As shown above, for any term M, one has M(YM) = YM, that is, Y produces a fixed 
point for M. In this particular case then, G(YG) = YG,  that is for:    
f = YG   
one has:    
f = Gf = ((fA)f)(fA)   
and then: 
((YG)A) = B 
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(B(YG)) = Φ 
or also: 
f = YG  
B = (YGA)   
Φ = ((YGA)(YG)))  
Hence, given A and once defined G = λx.((xA)x)(xA), one has the result that f, B and Φ 
are all defined in terms of A and of the fixed point operator Yvii.  
Self-application is a crucial “circularity feature” of type-free λ-calculus: it makes it 
possible to define recursion by a strong form of fixed point, the Y operator above (this 
operator is definable thanks to the “xx” occurrence, a key type-free term). As we 
showed, it is then possible to encode Rosen’s diagram in the formalism of λ-calculus by 
generating terms, which can work alternatively as functions or arguments. Note though 
that the λ-calculus algebra is non-commutative, which means xy ≠ yx, in general.  
Accordingly, x on the left has not the same role as the x on the right, and this clearly 
shows up both in the operational and in the mathematical semantics. In xx, for instance, 
the first x is interpreted as a function acting on the argument x (or, the “same” x is 
interpreted as function or argument, according to its position). In other words, the 
position and the parentheses give different mathematical meanings to terms, and the 
reading of a term makes it possible to reconstruct the different roles played by its sub-
terms. Following the above topological interpretation, à la Scott, if x is interpreted by 
the element d of D, then (xx) is interpreted by J(d)(d); dually, if x is interpreted by the 
function g in (D → D), then (xx) is interpreted by g(I(g)). So, for example, in  (fA) = B 
one understands that f acts, as a function, on argument A to produce output B. The type-
free structure though, makes it possible to change the role and obtain a different term, 
(Af) or (Bf) or whatever, both legal, as we have no typing constraints, but with different 
meanings (in the precise sense of different mathematical interpretations: (Af) is 
different from (fA), yet both are possible). In conclusion, the operational meaning of the 
efficient cause f as acting on the material cause A is fully preserved by the non-
commutative structure of the λ-calculus and its mathematical interpretationsviii. In other 
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words, there is an interpretation of the formalism we gave above which is consistent 
with the diagram depicted in Figure 1. 
The crucial implication of our demonstration is that, to the extent that λ-calculus is a 
canonical formalism for computability and programming, there are no conceptual or 
principled problems in realizing (programming) our formalism in a physical machine. In 
particular, as we will discuss in more detail in section 8, there are no conceptual 
problems in writing an application in which i) the three terms f, B and Φ work as 
programs; ii) each of them is a result produced by one of the other programs. Overall, 
this creates a situation where Rosen’s “closure to efficient causation” is deployed as a 
computer program f which writes a program B which writes a program Φ which writes 
the program f…. a quite ordinary circularity in functional programming. As a matter of 
fact, this is just the functional core of general recursion (Barendregt, 1984). 
6. Rosen’s conjecture revisited 
According to Rosen (1991), no model of closure to efficient causation (CTEC) could be 
Turing-computable: in a previous publication (Stewart & Mossio 2007) this is what we 
have called “Rosen’s conjecture”. Since the expression of closure to efficient causation 
in terms of λ-calculus implies that CTEC is computable, in a mathematically well-
defined sense, it follows immediately that there is a conceptual divergence between our 
proposal and Rosen’s conjecture, which clearly calls for comment. In order to identify 
the possible reasons for this difference, let us recapitulate the logic of Rosen’s 
demonstration. 
Rosen’s analysis of the computability of life phenomena may be split into two main 
aspects. Firstly, Rosen makes a fully general (and fundamental) remark:  
“The assertion that formalizations suffice in the expression of Natural Law, and 
hence, that causal entailment is to be reflected entirely in algorithms, is a form of 
Church’s Thesis... If it were true, the consequences that follow from its truth 
would clearly have the most staggering implications for all aspects of human 
thought. For good or ill, however, it is not true, not even in mathematics itself.” 
(Rosen, 1991, p. 191).  
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The form of Church’s Thesis mentioned here by Rosen is usually called the “physical 
Church Thesis”, and we entirely agree with Rosen’s claim about its failureix. The second 
aspect arises when Rosen continues, on the next page:  
“If f is simulable, then there is a Turing machine T such that, for any word w in 
the domain of f, suitably inscribed on an input tape to T, and for a suitably 
chosen initial state of T, the machine will halt after a finite number of steps, with 
f(w) in its output tape” (Rosen, 1991, p. 192).  
Rosen proceeds by proving that CTEC, which he takes as a key property of life, is a 
Natural Law, which does not satisfy the (physical) Church Thesis. In other words, no 
model of closure to efficient causation could be Turing-computable. Rosen correctly 
points out that the cycles defined by the diagrammatic approach to CTEC produce a 
regression to infinity. More precisely, Rosen’s demonstration of the theorem is based on 
the idea that if a (natural) system has a model which is Turing-computable, then its 
elements are fractionable. This means that different occurrences of the same element 
correspond to different states of the system, which have to be physically separated. 
Rosen offers then a reductio ad absurdum argument showing that that if we try to build 
a closed path of efficient causation with fractionable elements, we fall into an infinite 
regress in the definition, because iterated fractioning requires an operationally infinite 
behaviour (see below)x. Therefore we do not obtain a simulable function (Rosen, 1991, 
p. 238-241).  
In contrast to Rosen’s argument, we have shown in the previous section that CTEC can 
be expressed in the form of equations (as can all diagrams in Category Theory), and that 
those equations do have adequate computable (i.e. algorithmically representable, or 
“reflected in algorithms”, in Rosen’s terms) solutions through (partial) algorithms, as 
given by the λ−calculus implementation of General Recursion, by a strong fixed-point 
operator. Crucially, circular processes such as CTEC may give rise to non-halting 
computable cycles, which are an unavoidable component of general recursion, beyond 
primitive recursion (see Rosen’s sound distinction in the Appendix, footnote xxi). These 
cycles are beautifully represented by λ-calculus, which computes recursion (and, thus, 
also diverging computations) by the fixed-point operator. This makes it possible to write 
programs – finite strings of signs, no more no less than Rosen’s equations – which 
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formally describe the limit process of causal closure in Rosen’s sense. In a word, 
Rosen’s definitional infinite regress is perfectly handled by recursion, in particular as 
formalized in λ-calculus. At the same time, those programs simulating the closure may 
potentially activate an operationally infinite behaviourxi.  
Moreover, thanks to the richness of the formalism, in λ-calculus the (potentially 
infinite) operational nature of λ−terms is fully displayed (and explained) by the notion 
of the Böhm-tree of a λ-term (a rather complex definition, see Barendregt, 1984). A 
Böhm-tree may be an infinite tree. In particular, when λ-terms encode general 
recursion, which includes partial functions, the corresponding Böhm-trees may be 
infinite, as they display the operationally infinite behaviour of the intended 
computations. Yet, infinite Böhm-trees associated to λ-terms are recursively enumerable 
and effectively generated, i.e. the regression is effectively given (by a program if 
desired). In particular, one may have finitely branching infinite trees, which implement 
Rosen’s fractionabilityxii. Böhm-trees have been used in the semantic analysis of 
programs, precisely because they display their computational behaviour as being 
possibly circularly infinite (Barendregt & Longo, 1980).  
A further aspect concerning Rosen’s own demonstration may be worthy of comment. 
His demonstration that a computational implementation of CTEC leads to an infinite 
regress (Rosen, 1991, pp 238-241) is based on a rather peculiar version of closure to 
efficient causation, in which a single term is the efficient cause of two different objects. 
Accordingly instead of equation L3:  (Bf) = Φ, Rosen used a variant L3’: (fB) = Φxiii. 
This is in no way necessary for closure to efficient causation and it simply means that f 
has value B on A and Φ on B. Of course, we can deal also with this variant in terms of 
λ-calculus:    
(fA) = B   
(ΦB) = f 
(fB) = Φ. 
Consider: 
(ΦB)B = Φ,  
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from the last two equations. Then, G = λy.λx.(xy)y  gives:   
Φ = Y(GB).   
Similarly, from the first two equations, HA = λy.λx.(yx)A  gives:   
B = Y(HAΦ).   
Thus, one obtains:    
Φ = Y(G(Y(HAΦ)).   
By a further application of the fixed-point method to L = λx.Y(G(Y(HAx)), one has :  
Φ = YL   
thus:   
B = Y(HA(YL))   
and:   
f = ΦB. 
7. Recursion vs. Impredicativity 
In recent years, several contributions have tried to restate and justify the claim of the 
(non-) computability of Rosen’s diagram (Chemero & Turvey, 2007; Chemero & 
Turvey, 2006; Louie, 2007; Louie & Kercel, 2007; Louie, 2006). In his last work, 
Rosen himself claimed that “there is no algorithm for building something that is 
impredicative” (Rosen, 2000, p. 294). Indeed, according to Louie and co-workers, the 
crucial point is that the closed path of efficient causation described by Rosen forms a 
hierarchical cycle of containment in the natural system, which corresponds to an 
“impredicative” cycle of inferential entailment in the formal model. And 
impredicativity, these authors argue, is (supposedly) not compatible with computability. 
In a similar vein, Chemero and Turvey claimed that models of systems closed under 
efficient causation “contain impredicativities, and, therefore, are not computable” 
(Chemero & Turvey, 2006, p. 13. See also Chemero & Turvey, 2007)xiv.  
With respect to this claim, we would develop two arguments. The first one is that 
Rosen’s closed path of efficient causation is not an impredicative cycle. The second one 
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is that, even if it were the case, an impredicative cycle would still be computable. Let us 
briefly discuss the two issues.  
An impredicative definition defines sets or types or elements of a set (or of a type) in 
terms of the set (or type), which is being definedxv. Accordingly, Rosen’s definitions are 
circular in the usual sense of Recursion Theory (or of non-well-founded Set-Theories, 
see below), but not impredicative, because the circularity (or apparent regression to 
infinity) shows up only at the level of the terms and their mutual definition, but not at 
the level of the set (or type), which is being defined. The mutual definitions in equations 
E1, E2 and E3 – and the condensed form: f = f(f) = ff, in proper λ-calculus notation, 
mentioned by (Letelier et al. 2003) – are circular, and indeed recursive, but they are not 
impredicative. As a matter of fact, we have shown directly that they can be modelled 
quite simply in type-free λ-calculus (take G = λx.xx; then f = YG = G(YG) = ff = f(f)), a 
theory that predicatively lives in Martin-Löf Type Theory (Aczel, 1988). An alternative 
formalization of Rosen’s diagram, as hinted by Chemero and Turvey (Chemero & 
Turvey, 2008), may be provided by the (x∈x) circularities, at the core of non-well-
founded Set Theory, the Theory of Hyper-Sets, which turns out to be consistent, under 
restricted negationxvi. Note that, as proved in (Lindström, 1989), one can fully 
reconstruct the Theory of Hyper-Sets, thus the (x∈x) circularity, in predicative Type 
Theory and this in a predicative fashion. In conclusion, both the (xx) and the (x∈x) 
circularities are perfectly predicative, if treated in a rigorous mathematical framework. 
The second point is that impredicative structures may be perfectly computable, as is the 
paradigmatic example, the Impredicative Second Order Type Theory, system F (see 
Girard et al., 1989). System F is the most relevant example of an impredicative logical 
frame. Far from being incompatible with computability, it has actually been a rigorous 
formal tool for characterizing a large class of computable functions, the recursive 
functions that are provably total in Second Order Peano Arithmetic (PA2). This class, as 
defined in system F, provided an effective logical frame for the design of typed 
(polymorphic) programming languages (Cardelli & Longo, 1991). As further hinted in 
the note, system F is impredicative to the extent that some terms and types, as 
collections of terms, are defined by using a universal quantification over the very 
collection of types that is being defined. The terms in the impredicatively defined types, 
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in particular, are defined by using the type to which they belong and, even, the 
collection of all typesxvii. In conclusion, the argument, “since this is impredicative, then 
it is not computable”, is incorrect. 
Nevertheless, the xx and (x∈x) circularities, which are at the core of type-free recursion 
and non-well-founded Set Theory, are very expressive; and in fact they do have a non-
obvious mathematical connection with impredicativity. Within type-free λ-calculus and 
its “models”, such as Scott’s D∞ models (see Barendregt, 1984), one can construct an 
Impredicative Theory of Types. This can be done in a relatively “simple” way, based on 
the “finitary projections” model in (Amadio et al, 1986). It can also be done in a much 
more complex way, which preserves the II order logical structure of Girard’s 
impredicative system. That is, within a type-free model, one can “isolate” types (as 
partial equivalence relations), which forms an impredicative type-structure and satisfies 
Lawvere Topos-Theoretic understanding of quantification (Longo & Moggi 1991; 
Asperti & Longo, 1991)xviii. Similarly, models of the type-free λ-calculus (thus of xx) 
yield (approximated) models of non-well-founded set-theories, thus of (x∈x). 
Conversely, some approximated recursive domain equations, that is (approximated) 
models of (xx), may be given in Hyper Sets or Hyper Universes (see Forti et al., 1994; 
Longo, 2000 for a survey).  This is why one can equivalently treat Rosen’s circularities 
either by type-free λ−calculus (the (xx) circularity) or by Hyper-Universes (the (x∈x) 
circularity). 
Finally, one should observe that all of this can be made fully effective. Scott’s D∞ 
models may be constructed as effective limits of recursively enumerable chains of 
recursive enumerable sets and the entire Type Theoretic construction can be fully 
effectivized (Giannini & Longo, 1984). This completes our second argument according 
to which even if closure to efficient causation did involve impredicativity (which is not 
the case, in Rosen’s formalization), this would still not prove that it is not computable, 
since also Domain Theoretic solutions of recursive domain equations (typically, Scott’s 
D∞ models) are perfectly computable and, over them, one may construct models of 
(effective and) impredicative Type Theories. Their computer implementations are at the 
core of a large area of functional programming and its applications. 
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8. Towards a computer simulation of closure to efficient causation 
The motivation for this article, as stated in the introduction, is to work towards a 
mathematical formulation of Rosen’s concept of “closure to efficient causation” that 
would be intuitively understandable, biologically interpretable, and operationally 
generative. Rosen himself employed Category Theory, an extension of standard Set 
Theory in which mappings can themselves form objects. The type-free λ−calculus, at 
the syntactic level, and its categorical models, as mathematical/semantic interpretation, 
do indeed fulfil the key requirement that the same entity be able to occupy the three 
roles of argument (i.e. a set which is the input to an application or mapping), result (i.e. 
the set which is the end-point of the mapping) and function (i.e. the mapping itself). 
However, from the working theoretical biologist’s point of view, this formalism has a 
severe limitation. It is, in a way, too general; once written down, either in category-
theoretical terms or as one of Rosen’s “relational diagrams”, it just “sits there” and 
doesn’t actually do anything. Rosen himself commented that the absence of explicit 
dynamics in these diagrams was no accident, because the diagrams represent the 
organizational features of living organisms that, as long as the organism stays alive, 
remain invariant.  
This is of course extremely frustrating from the perspective of the traditional models of 
mathematical biology, which are almost entirely framed in terms of dynamical systems. 
Rosen (1973) did make an explicit attempt to articulate the relational theory of (M,R)-
systems with traditional differential equations. Unfortunately, this proposal has not 
proved usable. Letelier et al. (2006) have made a most commendable attempt to put 
Rosen’s category-theoretical formulation to work; but the actual results, so far, are not 
engaging. The key item in this formalism is what Rosen calls the “replication map”, in 
his notation b = ^b-1. Letelier et al. (2006) only manage to provide an illustration of this 
for a simple arithmetical example. This does have the value of an “existence proof”, 
showing that closure is both mathematically possible but non-trivial; but Letelier and 
colleagues recognize that this example is of little biological interest. These authors also 
make a most interesting attempt to make this formalism “work” in the case of a simple 
metabolic system; but unfortunately this attempt fails, on their own admission. 
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In this sort of situation, where there are strong qualitative intuitions but conventional 
dynamic systems theory is not able to express them, a most notable resource that has 
become increasingly available over the last 40 years is that of computer simulation. For 
example, the concept of autopoïesis (Maturana & Varela, 1980) – which, as we 
mentioned, has been compared to that of closure under efficient cause – has received 
several computational implementations (McMullin, 2004). The work of Fontana & Buss 
(1994), to which we have already referredxix, is also explicitly inspired by the work on 
autopoïesis. To date, there have been virtually no attempts to provide an illustration of 
closure to efficient causation by means of a computer simulation. This is quite 
understandable, if we consider the position not only of Rosen but also of many other 
authors, who have been adamant in insisting that models of closure under efficient 
cause are intrinsically non-computable. If they were right, any attempt in this direction 
would indeed stand condemned in advance of having missed some essential feature. The 
thrust of the present article is to suggest that although it is quite understandable, this 
position may be mistaken; and indeed it may actually be misguided and counter-
productive, since it has hindered attempts to develop simulations of closure under 
efficient cause.  
If correct, the work presented in this article is not a final conclusion, the end of a road; 
on the contrary, it opens up a new perspective. Our formal demonstration that Rosen’s 
equations do have a solution when expressed in terms of λ-calculus does not imply that 
this solution is biologically interesting; f = YG (where Y and G are the λ-calculus terms 
given above) is mathematically optimal (in a precise sense in view of its interpretation 
by least fixed points in Scott domains), yet it is not (necessarily) heuristically suggestive 
of “metabolism” as a biological phenomenon. The value of this solution is simply that 
of an existence-proof: computable solutions involving CTEC do exist, and we have 
exhibited one. It is essential to realize that this solution is absolutely not unique: there 
exist an unlimited number of more complex solutions, some of which may (and 
hopefully will) be susceptible of biological interpretation. The practical challenge now 
is to write computer programs in which the functions f, Φ and B are seriously 
interpretable as doing justice to their biological inspiration, i.e. “metabolism”, “repair” 
and “replication”.  
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As we have already indicated at greater length (Stewart & Mossio, 2007), we consider 
that a computational implementation of closure to efficient causation could best take the 
form of three computer programs, each of which writes the next onexx. The program 
“metabolism” – in barest outline, (fA) = B – takes a suitable input A: the material and 
energetic resources, which every living organism needs, as a thermodynamically open 
system functioning far from equilibrium. This function produces B – in the first 
instance, simply the whole network of biochemical reactions (but we will come back to 
the requirements on f). Working backwards, as it were, the second task is to write a 
program “repair” which, taking suitable input, will write the “metabolism” programme. 
Rosen writes (ΦB) = f, suggesting that B (in its role as an argument) may be a suitable 
input; but while this is not implausible we do not ourselves see a need to impose this as 
a constraint. We could, if necessary for plausible biological interpretation, write 
 (ΦX) = f  (L2bis)  
where X is any plausible resource (including A and B but possibly also further 
environmental resources). Relaxing the constraints in this way only multiplies the 
number of solutions to the three equations; but of course we now have to satisfy a new 
sort of constraint, i.e. biological plausibility.  
Working backwards again, the third step is to produce Φ by the « replication » function. 
Rosen writes: (Bf) = Φ, implying that the replication program takes f as input argument. 
This seems to us not only unnecessary, but also biologically quite implausible. To a first 
approximation we may consider that the metabolism function f includes enzymes (even 
if it is not reduced to that). Φ, as “replication” function, may be associated with nucleic 
acids. While the synthesis of nucleic acids clearly requires enzymes (as a part of the 
efficient cause of the process), it does not take enzymes (nor indeed proteins) as its 
substrate. We therefore prefer to write  
(BZ) = Φ  (L3bis) 
where Z is again the sum of all plausible resources (including A, B, indeed f if that 
should be a good idea, and again possibly also further environmental resources). As 
before, relaxing the constraints formally multiplies possible solutions – but with the cost 
that now they should be biologically plausible. 
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We are not yet finished, however, because now that B is a program in its own right, the 
“metabolism” function (fA) = B has a much heavier task than initially envisaged. B, 
produced by f acting on A, must now represent not only the full network of biochemical 
reactions which occur in the cell; B must also be a program which, given the right 
input, will produce Φ. This is, of course, a new constraint on f; and in turn this becomes 
also a new constraint on Φ which must produced the new f. Thus, the set of three 
programs impose mutual constraints on each other, in a cyclical fashion. This does not, 
however, involve a vicious infinite regress, as we have shown; on the contrary, it is just 
a nice challenge for theoretical biologists with programming capabilities. The guidelines 
we propose are to follow the structure of the λ-calculus formulation, and to translate our 
terms into LISP programs (which are identical to the λ-calculus up to some added 
“syntactic sugar”, as computer scientists say), or into any preferred (type-free) 
programming language. 
9. Conclusions 
As a final remark, we wish to note that although most workers in the field would 
probably agree that “closure to efficient causation” is a necessary condition for a living 
organism, as Rosen himself noted in his last work (Rosen, 2000) it may not be 
sufficient, for a fully satisfactory theoretical definition. And it may be, too, that such a 
full model would not be computable. The natural ecosystem of metabolic pathways is 
the turbulent cytoplasm of a living cell. Dynamical systems and dissipative structures of 
this sort are better understood in space-time continua, where (differentiable) dynamics 
are mostly analyzed by perturbative methods or geometric models. Dynamical notions 
such as sensitivity to initial conditions, topological transitivity and so on are essential. It 
has been noted by many that sufficiently chaotic dynamics are not approximated by 
discrete simulations; the latter yield informative, but different mathematical structures 
and evolutions (Longo & Paul, 2008; the “approximation”, if any, goes the other way-
round: continuous evolutions may approximate discrete dynamics, see the “Shadowing 
Lemma”, see Pilyugin, 1999). Furthermore, there is the question of  “local vs. global” 
causal entanglement which is proper to living systems in their many levels of 
organization, but which may also pose an obstacle to computability: the Theory of 
Criticality in Physics presents singularities which may be highly non-computable 
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(Bailly & Longo, 2006 & 2008).  We believe in fact that criticalities and singularities 
are at the core of life phenomena, as well as circularities and “resonances” between 
different levels of organisations (Bailly & Longo, 2006 & 2008). These may be hardly 
expressed both in SDDS and Computational Models, even though there is no fully 
formal argument for such a “negative result”.  
To sum up: it may well be that a full model of “life itself” is not computable; but if so, 
the reason would not be the closure to efficient causation as expressed by Rosen. In fact, 
as we have shown, an equational presentation such as Rosen’s naturally leads to λ-
calculus terms, a paradigmatic functional frame over discrete data types. Biological 
invariance is turned into perfect computational iteration (this is at the core of discrete 
computation and λ-calculus in particular, under the form of recursive definitions). And 
to reiterate our conclusion, the fact that closure to efficient causation is computable, 
according to a standard mathematical definition of the term, in no way disqualifies it as 
a fundamental contribution to a theoretical definition of life. 
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Appendix: On partial vs. total computable functions 
A possible interpretation of Rosen’s claim about non-computability of CTEC may 
concern the essential divergence of cycling computations. As a matter of fact, our 
proposed solution to the definitional circularity of CTEC, which Rosen claims to yield 
non-computable functions, actually gives computable, yet non-halting cycles. One may 
then argue that the apparent discrepancy between our result and Rosen’s conclusions 
stems from the fact that he restricts his demonstration to total computable functionsxxi, 
and does not include the case of partial functionsxxii. In this case, Rosen’s demonstration 
would be formally correct in its own terms; but its validity would depend on a restricted 
definition of “computability”, which actually excludes the class of partial computable 
mappings, in particular those that happen to compute cycles.  
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In our view, understanding the computability of CTEC (and the long-lasting discussion 
this issue has engendered) requires recalling the distinction between diverging 
computations and non-computability. Whereas the former refers to computations which 
do not satisfy the halting condition imposed by Rosen, the latter is related to the 
undecidability of the halting problem (i.e. the inexistence of an algorithm uniformly and 
effectively deciding for any machine and input whether the machine stops on it) 
formulated in the famous paper by Turing in 1936. As a matter of fact, Turing’s halting 
theorem shows two facts. First, the mathematically well-defined, total function deciding 
the general halting problem is not computable. Indeed, Classical Mathematics is full of 
well-defined, total, yet non-computable functions. Second (and as a consequence), 
classical (sequential) Theory of Computability essentially deals with partial 
computations, i.e. with computable functions, which diverge (do not halt) on some or all 
inputs. Of course, computations occur in discrete time and, thus, if they halt, they halt in 
finite time (Rogers, 1967, p. 5). Nevertheless, divergence is essential for computability, 
since not every partial computable function may be extended to a total computable 
function (a key result, see Rogers, 1967).  
There is one more fundamental reason for Computability Theory to deal with partial 
recursive functions in an essential way (Rogers, 1967; Barendregt, 1984). The reason is 
that the class of partial functions is effectively enumerable, whereas the class of total 
computable functions is not. Moreover, and this is crucial, the enumeration of the class 
of partial functions gives the Universal Turing Machine, which enumerates and 
computes all of them. More precisely, partiality is essential to obtain a set of indexes, 
which is effectively recursively enumerable (r.e.). By contrast, any non-empty sub-set 
of the total computable functions has a non r.e. set of indexes, as shown by the Rice-
Shapiro Theorem (Rogers, 1967, p. 324). In fact, even the constant or the primitive 
recursive functions (which contain no universal primitive recursive function) have non-
r.e. sets of all r.e. indexes. In contrast, there is no way to develop a Theory restricted to 
total and computable functions which would contain their universal function, a key 
theoretical and practical property of computabilityxxiii.  
To sum up, there is no expressive Theory of Computability restricted to total functions, 
nor even of any significant subclass of total functions: the impossibility of an effective 
enumeration of all programs, and the inexistence of internal universal functions, forbid 
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developing such a theory.  
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i Corresponding author. Telephone: +33.1.43.54.60.36. Fax: +33.1.43.54.60.36 
ii A reflexive object is an object A whose object of endomorphisms, A→A is isomorphic to – or is a 
retraction of – A itself. 
iii The relation between CCC and typed and type-free λ-calculus has been proposed by D.S. Scott since 
1970. For a full account see Barendregt (1984), Asperti & Longo (1991), Amadio & Curien (1998), 
Longo & Moggi (1990). 
iv A topos is more than a CCC, since it contains also the representation of all sub-objects, a relevant 
logical property. 
v I.e. dimension is preserved by topological isomorphisms. 
vi For recent reflections on this point, see Longo & Paul (2008), where the difficult relation between 
modelling of physical processes and Computability Theory is more closely analyzed. 
vii In case the reader prefers to have a term independent of A or “model” a process that, at the beginning, 
uses only one A, one can also “abstract” with respect to A and set H = λy. λx.((xy)x)(xy), which yields 
HA = G. 
viii For a general set-theoretic semantics, see (Longo, 1983); for a general Category Theoretic one, see 
(Longo & Moggi, 1990), quoted above. 
ix The reasons for this failure in (physics and) mathematics itself are discussed in Longo & Paul (2008).  
Its epistemological sense, for “human thought”, is critically examined in Longo (2008). 
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x See also Tim Gwinn’s analysis on this point: http://www.panmere.com/?p=79.  
xi In the Appendix, we discuss an alternative explanation of the divergence between our results and 
Rosen’s ones.  
xii A paradigmatic example is the tree of the recursion operator Y above, a finite term, of course, whose 
Böhm-tree is infinite. Böhm-trees thus express the infinite regress mentioned by Rosen in a perfectly 
computational fashion (apply f = YG that generates B which writes Φ which generates f..., the intended 
metabolic cycle). For example, fractionability, in some cases, boils down to the effective transformation 
from x  to (xx), where the first and the second x are distinct and play  different roles in the computation 
(see sect. 5 on non-commutativity). 
xiii This variant facilitates the demonstration of infinite regress; but it is not necessary, either for CTEC or 
for infinite regress. It might have been preferable for Rosen to demonstrate his theorem on the diagram 
representing canonical (M,R) systems; but in the event, nothing hangs on this.  
xiv In their most recent paper on the subject, Chemero and Turvey claim to have learned that “there is no 
necessary connection between impredicative definitions and non-Turing-computability” (Chemero & 
Turvey, 2008, p. 327).  
xv As a matter of fact, in 1902, there was some confusion between impredicative definitions and the 
predicate (x∈x), that is x belongs to x, which belongs to x... a circularity in Frege’s formalization of 
Cantor’s Set Theory which lead to Russell’s paradox (or, better, inconsistency) in type-free theories with 
unrestricted negation. The issue of impredicativity was later clarified by Poincaré (1906) and H. Weyl 
(1918). Since Russell’s work in the Theory of Types, in the early 1900’s, after his paradox, the 
mathematical setting where impredicativity has been rigorously analyzed is Type Theory, in particular in 
the modern sense of Church (1940). The work by Martin-Löf and Girard, since the ‘70s, represented the 
branching of Type Theory into a predicative frame (Martin-Löf, 1975) and an impredicative one, (Girard, 
1986). It resulted that “non-well-foundedness” of Frege-Cantor Set Theory is not an impredicativity as it 
corresponds to (xx) of type-freelcalculus, x applied to x, applied to x.... 
xvi Hypersets were invented, under different names, by Finsler in the ‘30s and, later by D.S. Scott in the 
‘60s. They were rigorously treated first in (Forti & Honsell, 1983), to which (Aczel, 1988) extensively 
refers. 
xvii The type-theoretic notion of impredicativity is fully general, that is, this definition yields also the set-
theoretic one, by changing, roughly, types into sets (and t:T, that is t has type T, into t∈T) . Second order 
types are defined by a universal quantification (for all X, that is ∀X) referring to the very collection of 
types, Type, that is being defined (formally: (∀X:Type.A) is in Type). Moreover the terms in these types, 
also use, in their definition, a universal quantification over the collection of all types. The relative 
consistency of this theory was first assured by a difficult consistency (normalization) theorem, see (Girard 
et al., 1989). 
xviii The delicate logical issue, here, is that the step of “isolating” an impredicative fragment within a type-
free model (which may live in predicative Theory of Types) is a highly impredicative conceptual 
construction. 
xix We are not able to do justice here to the relation between the present article, and the work of Fontana 
& Buss which is also centred on l-calculus; this relation would require an entire article in itself, as they 
claim that the key circularities of life phenomena are suitably representable in l-calculus (we do not go so 
far and just analyse some equations derived from Rosen’s approach). 
xx We retained here the l-calculus formulation because it is perfectly concise and precise for identifying 
argument, result and function. 
xxi Here, Rosen makes a sound distinction. In section 4D, and in particular equation [4D.2], he defines 
what he calls recursive functions. In the standard terminology (see Rogers, 1967), these are called 
primitive recursive functions. As Rosen writes, they satisfy the condition: “ f(n) entails f(n+1) for every 
n”. These functions are all total functions, and they form a (proper) subset of the class of total computable 
functions. Later, Rosen observes (p. 192): “it is perfectly possible to define mappings f in terms of 
algorithms, which do not satisfy this condition”. Thus, there exist total algorithmic functions that are not 
(primitive) recursive, as it is well-known. 
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xxii A function is total if it always associates to an (finite) input a (finite) output; it is partial otherwise (it 
may diverge on some or all inputs). 
xxiii Quite pragmatically, we may observe that operating systems (OS) and compilers are just programs, 
yet they act on programs (they are components of a Universal Turing Machine!); the key point being that 
in sequential computers which are never turned off, the OS and compilers are computable functions 
which run indefinitely. The same may be said of most network processes, which are not studied as input-
output halting functions: they are ongoing computational processes, not input-output halting relations. 
